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FOR PATIENTS AND PROFITS: ETHICAL 
ASTUTENESS AND THE BUSINESS OF 
DIALYSIS 
JOSHUA E. PERRY* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The business of health care is a unique enterprise wherein a 
combination of goods and services necessary to preserve or improve the 
health of another person are bought and sold.1  Whether in the physician’s 
office or in the clinical examination room or at the hospital bedside, the 
transfer of care from one person to another creates a unique relational 
dynamic at the center of this business transaction.  Often this engagement 
between physician and patient is infused with deep trust, intimacy, and 
vulnerability, as the encounter is frequently marked by fear, discomfort, and 
uncertainty regarding the potential life and death consequences of decisions 
made and actions taken.2 
                                                 
 *  Assistant Professor of Business Law & Ethics and Research Coordinator for the 
Center for the Business of Life Sciences, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University 
(Bloomington). I am grateful to the editors of the Belmont Law Review for the invitation to 
present a draft of this paper at their Fall 2014 Symposium and to the attendees, most notably 
Randy Spivey, Debbie Farringer, and John Blum, for constructive feedback offered during 
my presentation. 
 1. See generally Richard Smith et al., A Shared Statement of Ethical Principles for 
Those Who Shape and Give Health Care: A Working Draft from the Tavistock Group, 130 
ANN. INTERN. MED. 143, 145 (1999) (“Caring for sick people is a social obligation that 
extends beyond the commercial realm. Although ownership of health care delivery 
institutions or other organizations that deliver medical care may be appropriate, care itself 
cannot be owned and must be viewed as a service that is rendered and remunerated under the 
stewardship of those in the health care system rather than merely sold to individuals or 
communities.”). 
 2. For example, worried and bewildered parents often find themselves face-to-face 
with emergency room physicians and pediatricians. Beyond the dramas of parenthood, 
thousands of adult children every day must confront a different set of gut-wrenching 
dynamics as elderly parents waver between life and death. As one’s mom or dad, beloved 
friend, or life partner is in the process of dying, those who sit vigil at the bedside are in no 
mental or emotional condition to haggle over the price of palliative medications or second-
guess the necessity of additional MRIs and CT scans. Or consider the young woman or man, 
with a history of being sexually abused by authoritarian and trusted figures, sitting naked in 
an examination room, being asked intimate questions about his or her body, diet, and 
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These variables differentiate the business of delivering clinical 
healthcare services from other industries in several fundamental ways.3  
                                                                                                                 
lifestyle. It takes an enormous amount of courage and trust for someone to be that 
vulnerable. Yet, these are the dynamics of the doctor-patient relationship. 
  Each of these scenarios helps to reveal a little of what makes encounters with the 
health care system unique in one’s daily interaction with other actors and institutions in the 
marketplace. One’s interaction with one’s physician is simply categorically different than 
one’s interaction with the gal selling hamburgers or the guy handling overnight package 
delivery. The dynamics between a physician and her patient involve emotions and 
vulnerabilities that make it impossible for patients to be the rational and savvy consumers 
they might otherwise be in every other marketplace transaction. From the time of Ancient 
Greece until now, purveyors of the healing arts have recognized this gross disparity in 
“bargaining power” between one who needs care and who has the ability to provide care, 
and in response a rich and robust ethical tradition has evolved. In Physician-Owned 
Specialty Hospitals and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Health Care 
Reform at the Intersection of Law and Ethics, I argued that these ethical dynamics must be 
considered in the context of healthcare business. 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 369 (2012). 
 3. See Marc J. Roberts & Michael R. Reich, Ethical Analysis in Public Health, 359 
THE LANCET 1055, 1057 (2002) (“[H]ealth is generally viewed as special or different from 
most other things produced by the economy.”). See generally Norman Daniels, Justice, 
Health, and Healthcare, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 2 (2001); Norman Daniels, JUST HEALTH CARE 
(1985) (arguing that healthcare is “special” because of its impact on individual access to 
opportunity in a free society). In his 2001 essay in American Journal of Bioethics, Daniels, 
continuing to build upon Rawls’s theory of justice as fair equality of opportunity, succinctly 
states that “by keeping people close to normal functioning, healthcare preserves for people 
the ability to participate in the political, social, and economic life of their society. It sustains 
them as fully participating citizens—normal collaborators and competitors—in all spheres of 
social life.” Daniels, supra. But see Andrew C. Wicks & Adrian A.C. Keevil, When Worlds 
Collide: Medicine, Business, the Affordable Care Act and the Future of Health Care in the 
US, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 420 (2014). Wicks and Keevil offer a nuanced argument that 
notes the unique aspects of health care, while concluding that “if we take a larger view of 
business and health care, and see a broader array of stakeholder interests as legitimate and 
important, then it becomes possible to see the objectives of ‘medicine’ and those tied to 
‘business’ as less inherently in conflict—and requiring one system to dominate the other –
and to see how they may well be complementary.” Id. at 423. They continue: 
This is not an invitation to suggestions that if we just turn medicine into a 
marketplace then all of our problems are solved. Medicine is a special context 
and health care is not a “commodity,” particularly in the sense we use to talk 
about many of the discretionary goods that are bought and sold in traditional 
markets. Many would argue that access to health care is not a discretionary 
good (e.g., like ketchup or toothpaste). Rather, health care is a basic right that 
all persons have, particularly because of its fundamental importance to having 
other basic rights (citations omitted). At the same time there are powerful 
informational and power asymmetries that make choices about health care far 
more challenging than in other contexts. Both because of the complexity of 
the “product” and their lack of technical knowledge, patients frequently have 
difficulty fully grasping the background information relevant to 
understanding their condition and the options available to them for treatment. 
Their dependence on care providers to offer both diagnosis and treatment 
compounds the difficulty and underscores the need to create a system where 
patients are not misled or taken advantage of. Noting these challenges is not 
intended to suggest that the market for health care is completely different 
from other markets for goods and services, or that patients are fundamentally 
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First, physicians and nurses are professionals that have historically enjoyed 
a measure of public respect and deference concomitant with an expectation 
that their medical judgments would be guided first and foremost by what 
was in a particular patient’s best interest.4  This dynamic immediately 
complicates the common understanding of a business venture’s first and 
foremost priority, namely, to produce profits on behalf of shareholders or 
investors.5 
In the healthcare business, however, a patient, regardless of her 
socioeconomic status or level of education, ultimately must trust her 
healthcare professionals with her wellbeing.6  Even as sophisticated 
healthcare consumers seek multiple opinions and consult virtual libraries of 
data on the Internet, the motivation to self-educate and question is not 
driven by a “buyer beware” precaution regarding what alternative 
motivations – either to shareholder investors or to one’s personal ownership 
interests – might be lurking in the shadows and influencing their doctor’s 
medical judgment.  Rather, patients seek second opinions or second-guess 
their physicians because the practice of medicine is understood to be as 
much art as it is science.7  Sophisticated healthcare consumers appreciate 
the role that judgment plays in the decisions regarding appropriate medical 
                                                                                                                 
unable to advocate for themselves and make good choices. It is simply to note 
some of the distinctive conditions of health care and the need to design a 
system in which patients are put in positions where they can make informed 
and sound choices. 
Id. at 426. 
 4. See Troyen A. Brennan, An Ethical Perspective on Health Care Insurance Reform, 
19 AM. J.L. & MED. 37, 48 (1993) (“Indeed, traditional medical ethics insisted that 
physicians do everything possible for the individual patient, independent of political or 
economic constraints.”). See generally Joshua E. Perry, The Ethical Costs of 
Commercializing the Professions: First-Person Narratives From the Legal and Medical 
Trenches, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 169 (2010) (discussing the service component and 
relational aspects at the heart of historic notions of professionalism). 
 5. Perhaps the most enduring statement regarding the appropriate mission of a 
business is Milton Friedman’s classic, The Social Responsibility of Business to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 211 (“In either case, the key point is that, in his 
capacity as a corporate executive, the manager is the agent of the individuals who own the 
corporation or establish the eleemosynary institution, and his primary responsibility is to 
them.”). Contra LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING 
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 25 (2012)  (“The 
notion that corporate law requires directors, executives, and employees to maximize 
shareholder wealth simply isn’t true.”); Gilmartin and Freeman infra note 9. 
 6. See Andrew C. Wicks, Albert Schweitzer or Ivan Boesky? Why We Should Reject 
the Dichotomy Between Medicine and Business, 14 J. BUS. ETHICS 339, 341–42 (1995) 
(“Due to the nature of the physician-patient relationship under a fee-for-service arrangement, 
it is in the self-interest of the physician not only to apply beneficial therapies, but to be 
overzealous. Providing aggressive and even excessive care to patients actually benefits the 
physician financially.”). 
 7. Ann MacLean Massie, In Defense of the Professional Standard of Care: A 
Response to Carter Williams on “Evidence-Based Medicine”, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535, 
550 (2004) (citing Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Practice Parameters Be the Standard of 
Care in Malpractice Litigation?, 266 JAMA 2886, 2888 (1991)). 
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interventions.8  To be clear, however, unlike customers shopping on a used 
car lot or in a fashion boutique where the sales clerk works on commission, 
healthcare consumers are not expected to take into account what Albert 
Carr infamously referred to as the acceptable rules of puffery, deception, 
and self-interest that many understand to be operative in the game of 
business.9 
Moreover, consider the “products” of the healthcare delivery 
business.  These too are unique in the marketplace of goods and services.  
Maintaining good health, preventing the spread of disease, healing sickness, 
treating chronic and non-curable afflictions, surgical interventions, and 
improving life’s quality for those dying—these constitute the most popular 
and top-selling widgets in the doctoring business.10  All of these outcomes 
can be addressed by costly interventions, but not all require large 
expenditures or technological wizardry.11  Many healthcare objectives can 
be achieved at minimal financial cost.12  Yet, in some circumstances a 
physician’s motivations can become unnecessarily conflicted by financial 
incentives that complicate the relational dynamics and delicate balance 
between the pecuniary interests of the physician, the health interests of the 
patient, and the best interests of the broader society.13  One such 
circumstance, discussed in this article, is the business of dialysis. 
The healthcare delivery business is marked by at least these three 
distinctive qualities: the centrality of a relationship predicated upon trust 
between a professional healthcare provider and a patient; the unique 
potential for vulnerability and compromised judgment on the part of a 
                                                 
 8.  See Stephen A. Eraker & Peter Politser, How Decisions are Reached: Physician 
and Patient, in PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A READER IN CLINICAL DECISION MAKING 380, 
380–81 (1988). 
 9. Albert Z. Carr, Is Business Bluffing Ethical?, 46 HARV. BUS. REV. 143, 145 (1968) 
(“That most businessmen are not indifferent to ethics in their private lives, everyone will 
agree. My point is that in their office lives they cease to be private citizens, they become 
game players who must be guided by a somewhat different set of ethical standards.”). Of 
course, there are competing views of how the business “game” should be played. See Per 
Saxegaard, Being and Acting Business Worthy, in TIMOTHY L. FORT, THE VISION OF THE 
FIRM 282, 286 (2014) (“If you try to conduct business without a set of rules and values, it’s 
not business, it becomes “eat or be eaten.  . . .  We need to embrace ethical awareness and 
responsible conduct.”); Mattia J. Gilmartin & R. Edward Freeman, Business Ethics and 
Health Care: A Stakeholder Perspective 27 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 52 (2002) (arguing 
that much of the criticism of the business of health care flows from a “cowboy capitalism” 
conceptualization that frames business as a “competitive jungle resting on self-interest and 
an urge for competition in order to survive” which stakeholder theory challenges). 
 10. See Laurie Mortara, A Reminder of Medicine’s Main Purpose, KEVINMD (Oct. 5, 
2012), http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2012/10/reminder-medicines-main-purpose.html. 
 11.  See ALAN HAYCOX, WHAT IS HEALTH ECONOMICS? 1 (2d ed. 2009), available at 
http://www.medicine.ox.ac.uk/bandolier/painres/download/whatis/what_is_health_econ.pdf. 
 12. See id. at 2. 
 13. Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical 
Gatekeeping, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23, 24 (1986) (noting that “[w]hen the first 
physician requested a fee for his services, economics and conflict of interest entered 
medicine.”). 
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patient who views her physician first and foremost as an advocate for and 
guardian of her best interests; and the myriad, integrated issues of cost, 
quality, and access related to a finite supply of medical services and 
providers—all against the backdrop of a fundamental good, i.e., public 
health, necessary for the community to flourish.14  This trio of concerns 
makes the business of medicine unique—or at least heightens concerns 
raised by business ethicists—and triggers a particularly necessary and 
important reflection upon these ethical considerations. 
“Ethics in its broadest sense,” Larry Churchill observes, “concerns 
how we live and the choices we make.”15  In the context of practical policy 
deliberations, such ethical reflection facilitates review of the array of values 
in play and the commitments of the various participants.16  Contemplation 
of ethical concerns, ultimately, makes it possible to understand more fully 
the operative principles underlying stakeholders’ positions, as well as their 
implications and likely consequences if adopted.17  To the extent health 
policy decisions involve the prioritization of competing goods and the 
distribution of benefits and burdens, ethical deliberation is, therefore, 
essential.18  Moreover, as noted above, the delivery of healthcare is, “at its 
roots, a helping enterprise,”—a business permeated with the concept of 
care—that has been historically characterized by individual and corporate 
commitments to serving the best interests of others, not a reductionist 
pursuit of profit maximization driven by advertising campaigns, efforts to 
increase sales, and strategies for capturing market share.19  This article will 
argue that as a business that operates with some fundamentally unique 
variables, those in the healthcare business (particularly those engaged in the 
delivery of dialysis care to patients) should take seriously the concept of 
ethical astuteness (a concept that will be further described in Part V)—both 
as a professional safeguard against the creep of competing economic 
interests (driven by the demands of third party investors) that might 
                                                 
 14. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Preserving the Physician-
Patient Relationship in the Era of Managed Care, 273 JAMA 323 (1995) (identifying six 
core facets of the doctor-patient relationship: choice, competence, communication, 
compassion, continuity, and the absence of conflicts of interest). 
 15. Larry R. Churchill, What Ethics Can Contribute to Health Policy, in ETHICAL 
DIMENSIONS OF HEALTH POLICY 53 (Marion Danis, Carolyn Clancy & Larry R. Churchill 
eds., 2002). 
 16. See Brennan, supra note 4, at 53 (“The three principles that guide an ethics of 
health policy [include] . . . patient commitment, institutional commitment, and provider 
community orientation.”). 
 17. See Perry, supra note 2. 
 18. Brennan, supra note 4, at 72. 
 19. Brennan, supra note 4, at 38. See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Business vs. 
Medical Ethics: Conflicting Standards for Managed Care, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 236, 238 
(1995) (discussing what ethical standards will govern competitively managed healthcare 
organizations). But see Joshua E. Perry, An Obituary for Physician-Owned Specialty 
Hospitals, 23 HEALTH LAWYER 24, 24–34 (2010) (describing the tensions between 
commercialism and professionalism throughout the history of medical practice in the United 
States). 
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compromise the health care profession’s primary commitment to patient 
care and as a pragmatic strategy in the inevitable need to defend the 
healthcare provider against tort claims of medical malpractice. 
II.  FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE HEALTH CARE 
INDUSTRY20 
A.  The Rise of For-Profit Medicine 
Writing for the Institute of Medicine in 1983, Bradford Gray 
outlined the controversy surrounding the widespread emergence of for-
profit medicine during the 1970s.21  Proponents of the investor-owned trend 
in health care heralded the efficiencies, innovations, and fiscal discipline 
associated with business management practices designed to grow market 
share and maximize profits consistent with free market principles.22  Critics, 
however, argued that conflicts of interest are constitutive of for-profit 
business models that are premised upon financial incentives designed to 
encourage the ever-expanding consumption of finite and expensive goods.23  
Such conflicts of interest have, for example, resulted in well-documented 
cases of unnecessary medical services and treatments, often bloating 
systemic health care costs at taxpayers’ expense.24 
                                                 
 20. Much of what follows in this section was adapted from Joshua E. Perry & Robert 
C. Stone, In the Business of Dying: Questioning the Commercialization of Hospice, 39 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 224–234 (2010). 
 21. BRADFORD H. GRAY ET AL., An Introduction to the New Health Care for Profit, in 
THE NEW HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT 2 (1983). In fact, observers of the practice of medicine 
in America have been sounding alarms about the creeping commercialization of U.S. health 
care for at least the last thirty years. See Arnold S. Relman, A Second Opinion 36 (2007). It 
was 1980 when Arnold Relman, then editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, 
described what he alarmingly viewed as the “new medical-industrial complex” of for-profit 
corporations in the business of providing health care services to patients. Arnold S. Relman, 
The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 963 (1980) [hereinafter 
Relman, The New Medical Industrial Complex]. Dr. Relman was particularly concerned 
about the emergence of proprietary hospitals and nursing homes, as well as home care, 
diagnostic laboratory, and hemodialysis services. Id. 
 22. M. M. Hasan, Let’s End the Nonprofit Charade, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1053, 
1055 (1996). 
 23. Eleanor D. Kinney, For Profit Enterprise in Health Care: Can It Contribute to 
Health Reform?, 36 AM. J. L. & MED. 405, 428 (2010). 
 24. James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care 
Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 205, 209 (1996). 
Professor Blumstein cites numerous studies confirming the overutilization that results from 
perverse economic incentives. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVS., NO. OAI-12-88-01410, FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS 
AND HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES 18 (1989), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oai-12-
88-01410.pdf. (“Patients of referring physicians known to be owners or investors in clinical 
laboratories received, on the average, 45 percent more clinical laboratory services than all 
Medicare patients, in general, regardless of place.”); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NO. 
GAO/HEHS-95-2, REFERRALS TO PHYSICIAN-OWNED IMAGING FACILITIES; Blumstein, supra 
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In extreme cases, pressures to meet profit goals and satisfy investor 
expectations have resulted in fraud prosecutions of for-profit health care 
providers, most infamously realized in the cases of Tenet Healthcare and 
Healthcare Corporation of America (“HCA”), although the nonprofit sector 
has not been immune from government prosecution arising out of illicit 
reimbursement practices.25  It is precisely because of congressional cost 
concerns related to fraudulent billing and other improper over-utilization of 
Medicare-reimbursable services that anti-kickback legislation, the Stark 
laws, enforcement of the False Claims Act, and other regulatory efforts 
have proliferated from the mid-1970s through the most recent health care 
reforms of 2010.26 
Additionally, the emergence over the last thirty years of for-profit 
health providers has prompted concerns about whether ownership status has 
any correlation to the quality of care provided.27  On this point, the case of 
nursing homes is illustrative.  Relatively consistent data indicate that 
differences in care do exist between for-profit and nonprofit nursing home 
providers “as measured by staffing ratios, quality-of-care and quality of life 
                                                                                                                 
(“Studies of the use of diagnostic imaging equipment done in 1990 and 1994 showed that 
patients of physicians who had an ownership interest in such equipment utilized some 
equipment 400% more than the patients of nonowning physicians.”). J. M. Mitchell and E. 
Scott, Physician Ownership of Physical Therapy Services: Effects on Charges, Utilization, 
Profits, and Service Characteristics, 268 JAMA 2055, 2057 (1992) (finding physicians 
having ownership interests in physical therapy clinics or radiation therapy centers similarly 
recommended patient visits to such facilities fifty percent more than did other physicians.”). 
 Additionally, Marc Rodwin’s book, Medicine, Money, and Morals: Physicians’ 
Conflicts of Interest (1993) includes copious evidence of ways in which physician self-
interest results in Medicare abuse. For example, Rodwin cites a December 17, 1987, 
personal letter from Jim Codo, a medical laboratory salesperson who claimed that “where a 
high percent of Medicare recipients reside, there is a correspondingly high percent of 
physicians invested in laboratory ownership arrangements. The government in allowing such 
[practices] . . . might as well issue the physician owners their own money press. The 
physician controls the demand for services, owns the supply of the services, and is 
guaranteed payment for services by the government.” Id. at 97. Moreover, in his article 
Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest: The Limitations of Disclosure, Rodwin points to eighteen 
published studies by academic researchers and government regulators between 1970 and 
1992 as evidence “that physicians who make referrals to medical facilities that they either 
own or have a financial interest in recommend more (or more expensive) medical tests and 
procedures than do physicians without a financial interest.” 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1405, 
1406 (1989). 
 25. Kurt Eichenwald, HCA is Said to Reach Deal on Settlement of Fraud Case, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/18/business/hca-is-said-to-reach-
deal-on-settlement-of-fraud-case.html (reporting on an agreement with the Justice 
Department to pay more than $880 million to settle a long-running inquiry into accusations 
of health care fraud). See also E. T. Wood, Feds Win $19.4M in Lawsuit over Renal Care 
Group Medicare Practices, 
NASHVILLE POST (Mar. 23, 2010), https://www.nashvillepost.com/news/2010/3/23/feds_win
_194m_in_lawsuit_over_renal_care_group_medicare_practices. 
 26. Perry, supra note 19. 
 27. COMM. FOR IMPLICATIONS OF FOR-PROFIT ENTER. IN HEALTH CARE, FOR PROFIT 
ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 3 (Bradford H. Gray, ed. 1986). 
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deficiencies, advance care planning discussions, complaints per home, and, 
in some cases, adverse health outcomes.”28  The conflicting interests inher-
ent in the incentive structures of for-profit health care endeavors demand 
careful scrutiny. 
B. The Medical-Industrial Complex and Dialysis 
Dialysis, in fact, presents a “particularly interesting example of 
stimulation of private enterprise by public financing of health care.”29  
When former New England Journal of Medicine editor Arnold Relman 
wrote about the emerging “medical-industrial complex,” he was referring in 
part to the rapid expansion of the patient population receiving long-term 
hemodialysis following Congress’s decision in 1972 to cover treatment of 
end-stage renal disease under Medicare.30  Fueled by the flow of federal 
funds, the for-profit dialysis industry mushroomed from nearly non-existent 
in the early 1970s to a 40% market share by 1980.31 
By 2002, 75% of dialysis services were provided by private, for-
profit facilities, and early fears about compromises in patient care were 
being realized in the form of longer hospital stays (17% more days in 
hospital) and increased risk for premature patient death among for-profit 
providers.32  One of the most recent studies, published January 9, 2014, 
reported that overall hospitalization rates were significantly higher (15%) 
for patients receiving dialysis in for-profit compared with nonprofit dialysis 
                                                 
 28. Melissa D. A. Carlson, William T. Gallo & Elizabeth H. Bradley, Ownership 
Status and Patterns of Care in Hospice: Results from the National Home and Hospice Care 
Survey, 42 MED. CARE 432 (2004) (citing W. E. Aaronson et al., Do For-Profit and Not-For-
Profit Nursing Homes Behave Differently? 34 GERONTOLOGIST 775 (1994); C. Harrington et 
al., Does Investor Ownership of Nursing Homes Compromise the Quality of Care?, 91 AM. 
J. PUB. HEALTH 1452 (2001); E. H. Bradley and C. W. Walker, Education and Advance Care 
Planning in Nursing Homes: The Impact of Ownership Type, 27 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY 
SECTOR Q. 339 (1998); B. A. Weisbrod and M. Schlesinger, Public, Private, Nonprofit 
Ownership and the Response to Asymmetric Information: The Case of the Nursing Homes, in 
THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS (S. Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986); S. Y. Chou, 
Asymmetric Information, Ownership and Quality of Care: An Empirical Analysis of Nursing 
Homes, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 293 (2002)). See generally Vikram R. Comondore et al., 
Quality of Care in For-Profit and Not-For-Profit Nursing Homes: Systematic Review and 
Meta-Analysis, 339 BRIT. MED. J. 381 (2009). 
 29.  Relman,The New Medical Industrial Complex, supra note 21, at 965. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. P. J. Devereaux et al., Comparison of Mortality Between Private For-Profit and 
Private Not-For-Profit Hemodialysis Centers: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 288 
JAMA 2449, 2450 (2002); L.A. Szczech et al., Associations Between CMS’s Clinical 
Performance Measures Project Benchmarks, Profit Structure, and Mortality in Dialysis 
Units, 69 KIDNEY INT’L 2094, 2097 (2006) (“[I]rrespective of its minor contribution, profit 
status was associated with mortality.”); Donald K.K. Lee, et al., Reexploring Differences 
Among For-Profit and Nonprofit Dialysis Providers, 45 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 633, 640 
(2010); Y. Zhang et al., The Effect of Dialysis Chains on Mortality Among Patients 
Receiving Hemodialysis, 46 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 747, 759 (2011). 
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facilities.33  Furthermore, for-profit dialysis facilities had higher admission 
rates for heart failure and volume overload (37% higher), as well as 
vascular access complications (15% higher) compared with nonprofit 
facilities.34  These findings echo data published fifteen years ago in the New 
England Journal of Medicine that also documented an association between 
for-profit ownership and a lower quality of care.35 
Similarly, additional studies have shown greater utilization of 
erythropoiesis-stimulating agents (i.e., Epogen, Epoetin, or EPO – the 
primary drug used to treat anemia resulting from kidney disease) in for-
profit versus nonprofit facilities.36  In fact, Medicare reimbursements for 
Epogen—the second-largest source of dialysis facility income—were 
discovered to be incentivizing large, for-profit chain facilities to administer 
dosages of the drug in excess of the clinical guidelines, which resulted in a 
January 1, 2011, change in Medicare payment structures.37 
Finally, it should be noted that researchers have also found 
decreased rates of listing for transplantation in for-profit facilities, as well 
as decreased transplant education time with nephrologists at for-profit 
compared with nonprofit dialysis facilities.38  Attempting to explain their 
findings, these researchers pointed to a greater emphasis on income 
generation and concomitant lack of incentives for unprofitable interventions 
at for-profit dialysis facilities.39 
                                                 
 33. Lorien S. Dalrymple et al., Comparison of Hospitalization Rates Among For-
Profit and Nonprofit Dialysis Facilities, 9 CLINICAL J. AM. SOC’Y NEPHROLOGY 73, 73 
(2014). 
 34. Barry M. Straube, Do Health Outcomes Vary by Profit Status of Hemodialysis 
Units?, 9 CLINICAL J. AM. SOC’Y NEPHROLOGY 1, 1 (2014). 
 35. Pushkal P. Garg et al., Effect of the Ownership of Dialysis Facilities on Patients’ 
Survival and Referral for Transplantation, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1653 (1999). J.M. Brooks 
et al., Effect of Dialysis Center Profit-Status on Patient Survival: A Comparison of Risk-
Adjustment and Instrumental Variable Approaches, 41 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 2267, 2286 
(2006) (finding that “the competitive market for dialysis services forced all dialysis 
providers to maintain sufficient quality levels regardless of the overriding goals of each 
organization.”). 
 36. In July 2012, DaVita agreed to pay $55 million to the federal government to settle 
allegations related to its use of Epogen in dialysis patients. See Michael Booth and 
Christopher N. Osher, Denver-Based DaVita Settles Case on Overuse of Kidney Care Drug, 
THE DENVER POST (July 4, 2012), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_21002816/denver-based-
davita-settles-case-overuse-kidney-care (“The Texas whistleblower lawsuit accused DaVita 
of using more Epogen than was medically necessary, and for double-billing the government 
for Epogen left over in vials and reused.”). See generally M. Thamer et al., Dialysis Facility 
Ownership and Epoetin Dosing in Patients Receiving Hemodialysis, 297 JAMA 1667 
(2007). 
 37. Thomas A. Golper et al., Home Dialysis in the New USA Bundled Payment Plan: 
Implications and Impact, 31 PERITONEAL DIALYSIS INT’L 12 (2011). 
 38. Garg, supra note 35; K.S. Balhara, et al., Disparities in Provision of Transplant 
Education by Profit Status of the Dialysis Center, 12 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 3104 (2012). 
 39. See Garg, supra note 35, at 1660; Balhara, supra note 38, at 3110. 
46 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2: 37 
III.  THE DAVITA CASE STUDY40 
With revenue in excess of $8 billion41 and more than 50,000 
employees,42  DaVita HealthCare Partners, Inc. is one of the United States’ 
leading providers of kidney care, i.e., dialysis services, and related lab 
services.43  According to filings with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, DaVita provides dialysis and administrative services in the 
United States through a network of 2,074 outpatient dialysis centers in 
forty-five states and the District of Columbia, serving a total of 
approximately 163,000 patients.44  DaVita also provides acute inpatient 
dialysis services in approximately 1,000 hospitals and related laboratory 
services throughout the United States.45 
A.  Case of William Pepper 
On the morning of January 8, 2009, William Pepper began 
outpatient dialysis treatment at Yakima Dialysis Center 
(hereinafter, “DaVita”), a medical facility owned and 
operated by [DaVita, Inc. and Renal Treatment Centers 
West, Inc].  At the time of his treatment, Mr. Pepper 
                                                 
 40. A review of research of litigation involving DaVita revealed the following cases: 
Miles v. DaVita RX, LLC, 962 F.Supp.2d 825 (D. Md. 2013) (involving a Title VII hostile 
work environment claim); IHS Dialysis, Inc. v. DaVita, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 2468(ER), 2013 
WL 1309737 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2013) (involving an antitrust action); United States v. 
DaVita, Inc. and Gambro Healthcare, Inc., No. 1:07–CV–2509–CAP, 2013 WL 1342431 
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2013) (involving a contract dispute and False Claims Act claim); 
Chapman v. DaVita, Inc., 380 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2012) (involving a worker’s compensation 
claim); Hunt v. DaVita, Inc., No. 10–602–GPM, 2011 WL 2532845 (S.D. Ill. June 24, 2011) 
(involving a retaliatory discharge claim); Moran v. DaVita, Inc., No. 06-5620(JAP), 2009 
WL 792074 (D. N.J. Mar. 23, 2009) (involving an employment dispute); Total Renal Care, 
Inc. v. W. Nephrology and Metabolic Bone Disease, P.C., No. 08–cv–00513–CMA–KMT, 
2009 WL 2596493 (D. Colo. Aug. 21, 2009) (involving an antitrust action); Mason v. 
DaVita, Inc., 542 F. Supp.2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008) (involving an employment dispute); 
Hardiman v. DaVita, Inc., No. 2:05-CV-262-JM, 2007 WL 1395568 (N.D. Ind. May 10, 
2007) (involving a negligence action); Gambini v. Total Renal Care, Inc., 480 F.3d 950 (9th 
Cir., 2007) (involving a FMLA employment dispute); DaVita, Inc. v. Washington State 
Dep’t of Health, 151 P.3d 1095 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (involving a dispute regarding 
Certificate of Need decision); Martinez v. DaVita, Inc., 598 S.E.2d 334 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) 
(involving a covenant not to compete dispute). 
 41. Senior Analyst—Revenue Operations, Team Revelation: Position Description, 
DAVITA, http://careers.davita.com/search/208802/37027/senior-analyst-revenue-operations-
team-revelation (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
 42. Our Careers, DAVITA, http://careers.davita.com/careers (last visited Mar. 24, 
2015). 
 43. DAVITA HEALTHCARE PARTNERS, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) 2 (2014), 
available at http://yahoo.brand.edgar-online.com/displayfilinginfo.aspx?FilingID=9802387-
1121-936138&type=sect&TabIndex=2&dcn=0001193125-14-062565&nav=1&src=Yahoo. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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exhibited signs of poor health: he was receiving controlled 
delivery of oxygen, and required significant assistance to 
move himself into the dialysis chair to receive treatment.  
Some DaVita staff members expressed concern that Mr. 
Pepper was receiving outpatient—as opposed to 
inpatient—dialysis treatment, given his poor condition.  
Customarily, dialysis patients who are more fragile or ill 
require a higher level of supervision than healthier patients, 
and thus receive inpatient treatment. 46 
At approximately 1:55 p.m. that afternoon—several hours 
into Mr. Pepper’s dialysis treatment—DaVita’s medical 
staff discovered that Mr. Pepper was unconscious and not 
breathing.  A large amount of Mr. Pepper’s blood had 
pooled on the floor beneath his dialysis chair, and blood 
also covered the chair itself and Mr. Pepper’s clothes.  
Upon discovering his condition, DaVita staff began treating 
Mr. Pepper.  Although Mr. Pepper briefly regained 
consciousness, he was subsequently transported to 
Memorial Hospital, where he died at 9:20 p.m. that 
evening.47 
At the time Mr. Pepper exsanguinated, [i.e., experienced 
his extreme blood loss], many DaVita staff members were 
participating in a “mock audit” in preparation for an actual 
upcoming audit by the Washington State Department of 
Health (“DOH”).  During this mock audit, only two patient 
care technicians (“PCTs”) were assigned to the treatment 
“pod” in which Mr. Pepper and six other dialysis patients 
were receiving treatment.  One of the PCTs, Mauro 
Hernandez, was on break and not in the treatment area at 
the time Mr. Pepper exsanguinated.  The other PCT, 
Bonnie Hursh, was connecting another patient to a dialysis 
machine at the time of the incident. . . .  Plaintiff’s 
[proffered] expert, Tricia West, R.N. [testified during her 
deposition] that Mr. Pepper’s substantial blood loss was, by 
itself, evidence of a problem with the visibility of Mr. 
Pepper’s dialysis access.  [Nurse West further testified,] “I 
believe that [had Mr. Pepper’s] access been visible and 
                                                 
 46. Sutton v. Renal Treatment Centers W., Inc., No. CV–10–3067–EFS, 2013 WL 
550241 (E.D. Wash. Feb 12, 2013). 
 47. Id. 
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[had DaVita’s staff] observed the dislodged needle, they 
would have intervened and stopped the blood loss.”48 
. . . . 
In response to Mr. Pepper’s death, DOH began 
investigating DaVita’s patient safety practices.  Several 
weeks following Mr. Pepper’s death, DOH investigators 
visited the DaVita facility and found that the dialysis 
accesses of four separate patients were not visible to 
facility staff at all times during treatment [as required by 
federal regulations].  DOH also interviewed the facility’s 
administrator, Shomei Meister, and determined that she did 
not know the proper definition of “visible at all times” with 
regard to a patient’s access.  DOH concluded that DaVita’s 
policies and procedures did not properly define—and that 
facility staff did not have a clear understanding of what 
constituted—a “visible dialysis access.”49 
B. Case of Deborah Scott 
[Deborah Scott], a social worker, was an “at will” 
employee at DaVita’s North Oakland Dialysis Facility 
(“DaVita Facility”) in Pontiac, Michigan, from 1996 to 
February 5, 2004. . . .  In or around November 2003, [Ms. 
Scott called] a toll-free phone number that was posted at 
the DaVita Facility [to complain] about “staffing 
irregularities,” such as inadequate and inaccurate reporting 
of staffing and high staff turnover that she felt adversely 
impacted patient safety.  [Additionally, Scott] complained 
about “charting irregularities” such as long-term care plans 
were not done as often as required.  [Later, during audits 
from state regulators, Ms. Scott] made similar complaints 
about “short staffing, charting issues, turnover in staff,” the 
hiring of inexperienced replacements for technicians, 
“scheduling irregularities,” and patients’ fear about their 
safety. 50 
                                                 
 48. Id. at *1. “Defendants argued that Nurse West’s opinion about these two potential 
causes for Mr. Pepper’s exsanguination constituted impermissible speculation,” but the court 
disagreed and denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Id. at *3. 
 49. Id. at *2. 
 50. Scott v. Total Renal Care, Inc., No. 04-71700, 2005 WL 1680677, *1 (E.D. Mich. 
July 19, 2005). 
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Either as a result of Ms. Scott’s complaints or patients’ complaints, 
state regulators made an unannounced visit to the DaVita Facility on 
January 16-18, 2004 and issued citations for lack of documentation 
regarding long-term care and insufficient staffing.51  Ms. Scott was 
terminated on February 5, 2004 and later filed a claim for retaliatory 
termination on May 5, 2004.52  Finding that Ms. Scott was unable to show 
that she was discharged because of her protected activity, her claims were 
dismissed by the court.53 
C. Case of Demitria Howard 
Beginning in late 2007, DaVita employed Demitria 
Howard as a dialysis technician.54  Although Howard 
regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week, she sued 
DaVita alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
on the basis that DaVita did not credit her any time beyond 
40 hours, nor did DaVita fully compensate her.55 
In March 2010, Howard sent an email to the DaVita’s 
regional operations director, Matthew Forsythe, to inform 
him that she had not been fully compensated for the hours 
she worked.  In May 2010, Forsythe met with Howard to 
discuss the back pay owed to her.  Forsythe offered back 
pay, but Howard alleges that DaVita owed her significantly 
more than Forsythe offered.  Also, Howard allege[d] that 
DaVita did not compensate other dialysis technicians for 
overtime at one and one-half times the regular rate.  Last, 
Howard allege[d] that it was DaVita’s policy and practice 
to falsely deduct hours from its employees[‘] time cards to 
bring their total hours below 40 per week to avoid paying 
overtime.56 
The trial court denied DaVita’s motion to dismiss pursuant to 
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), finding Howard’s claims plausible on their face because 
she had alleged enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that 
subsequent discovery would reveal evidence supporting her allegations.57 
                                                 
 51. Id. at *3. 
 52. Id. at *4. 
 53. Id. at *11. 
 54. Howard v. Renal Life Link, Inc., No. 10 C 3225, 2010 WL 4483323, at *1 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 1, 2010). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at *2. 
 57. Id. at *3. 
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D. Accusations of Medicare Fraud and Stark Kickback Violations 
In July 2012, DaVita agreed to pay $55 million to the federal 
government to settle allegations raised by whistleblowers in Texas related 
to its use of Epogen (a drug used to treat anemia) in dialysis patients.58  
Overuse of Epogen can lead to heart problems, blood clots, and even 
premature deaths.59 As of 2007, prior to new Medicare reimbursement 
policies that now limit use of Epogen, 25% of DaVita’s revenue and up to 
40% of its earnings were connected to the drug, according to the Stanford 
Group Company research firm.60 
Filed in 2007 (but only unsealed in 2010), whistle-blower litigation 
is currently pending in Georgia federal court alleging $800 million in 
Medicare fraud from 2003 through 2010 related to administration and 
wastage of the drugs Zemplar and Venofer.61  The lawsuit alleges that 
DaVita required nurses to use one ten-microgram vial of Zemplar, a vitamin 
D drug, instead of a six-microgram does in three two-microgram vials.62  
DaVita then billed Medicare for all ten micrograms even though four were 
not used.63  Instead of giving an entire 100-milligram vial of Venofer, an 
iron drug, once or twice a month, the clinics gave twenty-five-milligram 
doses more frequently, according to the lawsuit.64  But since the drug came 
only in a 100-milligram vial, Medicare was billed for 100 milligrams for 
each dose, even though seventy-five milligrams were wasted, the lawsuit 
says.65 
While DaVita denies all wrongdoing in these Medicare fraud qui 
tam actions – even in the case of its $55 million settlement regarding 
Epogen abuse – 2008 figures from a government-funded program that 
tracks dialysis in the United States reveal that DaVita spent more per 
patient on iron drugs, Vitamin D drugs, and Epogen than any other chain 
dialysis provider.66 
In February 2014, DaVita announced it would pay $389 million to 
settle criminal and civil anti-kickback charges stemming from a multi-year 
                                                 
 58. Booth & Osher, supra note 36. 
 59. Andrew Pollack, The Dialysis Business: Fair Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 
2007, at B1. 
 60. Id. 
 61. United States ex rel. Vainer v. DaVita, Inc. and Gambro Healthcare, Inc., No. 
1:07-CV-2509-CAP, 2013 WL 1342431, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2013) (denying 
defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment). See also Bill Rankin, Whistle-Blowers 
Say Dialysis Firm Bilked Medicare, ATL. J. CONST. (Dec. 7, 2012), 
http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/differing-views-in-massive-whistle-blower-
case/nTPwY/; Andrew Pollack, Lawsuit Says Drugs Were Wasted to Buoy Profit, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 25, 2011, at B1. 
 62. United States ex rel. Vainer, 2013 WL 1342431, at *8. 
 63. Id. at *2. 
 64. See Pollack supra note 59. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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investigation by the U. S. Attorney’s Office in Denver, the civil division of 
the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services’ Office of Inspector General into whether DaVita’s joint 
ventures with kidney doctors complied with the Stark laws governing 
financial relationships that might influence where patients seek medical 
treatment.67 
E. Kent Thiry, DaVita CEO: Success and “Cult of Personality”68
  
When Kent Thiry was recruited to run Total Renal Care in 1999, its 
revenue was $1.4 billion and its stock traded around $2.69  Thiry changed 
the company’s name to DaVita and overhauled the corporate culture.70  
Often referred to as the “Mayor” of the “DaVita Village,”  Thiry is known 
to wear a musketeer outfit and enthusiastically (and dramatically) cheerlead 
at corporate training events with an “All for One, and One for All” chant 
and over-the-top presentation antics.71  By 2006, Thiry had taken the 
company to $4.9 billion in revenues and a $62 stock price.72  As of 2012, 
revenues had soared to $8.1 billion and stock was selling near $100.73  
Headquartered in Denver, DaVita owns approximately 2,100 outpatient 
dialysis centers (second in market share behind German-owned Fresenius) 
in forty-five states and the District of Columbia, serves 163,000 patients 
and employees over 53,000 people.74 
DaVita has been lauded as the subject of a Stanford Business 
School case study,75 recognized by CNN Money as #2 on its rankings of the 
“World’s Most Admired Companies” in healthcare, and – for four 
consecutive years – ranked number one in innovation on Fortune 
Magazine’s “World’s Most Admired Companies” ranking of health care 
facilities.76  Moreover, DaVita’s compliance and ethics training program, 
which recently received the “Health Ethics Trust’s Best Practices” Award, 
                                                 
 67. See Christopher N. Osher, DaVita to Pay $389 Million to Settle Anti-Kickback 
Investigation, THE DENV. POST (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_26780
485/davita-pay-389-million-settle-anti-kickback-investigations. 
 68. Luc Hatlestad, The Strangest Show on Earth, 5280 MAGAZINE, Sept. 2012, 
available at http://www.5280.com/magazine/2012/09/strangest-show-earth. 
 69. Pollack, supra note 59. 
 70. Hatlestad, supra note 68. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Pollack, supra note 59. 
 73. Hatlestaad, supra note 68. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Jeffrey Pfeffer, KENT THIRY AND DAVITA: LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES IN BUILDING 
AND GROWING A GREAT COMPANY, Case OB-54, STAN. GRAD. SCHOOL OF BUS., (2006). 
 76. DAVITA HEALTH CARE PARTNERS, AWARDS AND RECOGNITION, DAVITA, 
http://www.davita.com/UploadedFiles/About_v4/Media_Room/Awards_and_Recognition.p
df (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). 
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has been in place since at least 2005.77  It is composed of fifty full-time 
employees and is led by Jeanine Jiganti, chief compliance officer.78  
DaVita’s approach to compliance and ethics training combines in-person 
training sessions, automated online training, and ongoing real-time 
guidance and support from the company’s compliance team.79  According 
to a report in the journal Ethikos, DaVita employees are administered 
compliance training upon hire, and required to complete at least one 
compliance training course per year (more, depending on the position and 
role within the company), with the majority of these trainings occurring via 
an online educational experience.80  Sarah Richardson, a senior director in 
the compliance department notes that the focus of trainings for “office-
based teammates” is on “the False Claims Act, kickback policies, and how 
to interpret federal regulations,” while patient care is the top concern among 
those DaVita employees located in clinical settings.81 
The compliance and ethics training program notwithstanding, as 
documented above, a review of legal filings and media reports raises a 
variety of cases that, in the aggregate, reveal a healthcare firm with 
financial interests potentially in conflict with the ultimate professional 
mandate of any health care provider, namely, delivering quality health care 
in a manner and means that protects the best interest of the patient.  
Furthermore, as a matter of business strategy, a more robust recognition of 
the competing interests introduced by a for-profit business model might 
mitigate exposure to legal liabilities arising out of malpractice claims. 
IV. LEGAL ASTUTENESS AS A TEMPLATE FOR ETHICAL 
ASTUTENESS 
In 2008, Professor Constance Bagley published a ground-breaking 
paper in the prestigious Academy of Management Review wherein she 
argued that “failure to integrate law into the development of strategy and of 
action plans can place a firm at a competitive disadvantage.”82  Bagley 
labeled her concept “legal astuteness” and described it further as “the 
ability of a [top management team] to communicate effectively with 
counsel and to work together to solve complex problems” by developing 
“(1) a set of value-laden attitudes,” (2) a proactive approach, (3) the ability 
to exercise informed judgment, and (4) context-specific knowledge of the 
relevant law and appropriate application of legal tools.”83  The value of 
                                                 
 77. Alexandra Theodore, When It Comes to Compliance Training, DaVita Seeks to 
Add ‘Adventure,’ 27 ETHIKOS 1, 1–2 (Nov–Dec. 2013). 
 78. Id. at 2. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 3. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Constance E. Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal Astuteness, 33 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 378, 378–79 (2008). 
 83. Id. at 379. 
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“legal astuteness” to an organization might be realized as better internal 
management or competitive advantage in the market through increased 
value along one or more of these strategically important domains.84  After 
elaborating briefly on Bagley’s work, Part V argues that in the context of 
healthcare businesses, such as the business of dialysis, a failure to integrate 
ethical astuteness into the firm’s culture can similarly create market 
disadvantages and potential legal exposure. 
A.  The Attitudinal Component of Legal Astuteness 
For business managers, the law, as well as related regulations, sets 
forth the boundaries of what is and what is not permissible.85  In a 
normative sense, the law also functions as a reflection of society’s values 
and attitudes regarding right conduct, and savvy is the organizational 
manager who respects not only the letter, but also the spirit of laws relevant 
to her industry.86  As Bagley notes, “legally astute management teams 
understand the importance of anticipating tomorrow’s laws and of trying to 
predict how existing laws may be interpreted, enforced, and changed in the 
future.”87  How a firm responds to the grey areas surrounding bright line 
legal rules can impact the firm’s public reputation for good or ill.88 
B.  The Proactive Component of Legal Astuteness 
As Mary Daly observes, business managers desire legal counsel 
that addresses business opportunities and threats in ways that are effective, 
efficient, and strategic.89  Contrary to how some business professionals 
view the law, those bringing “legal astuteness” to business decision-making 
need not be merely restrictive and concerned with policing business 
conduct.90  Rather, forward-thinking, creative and legally astute 
management teams can add significant value in the execution of business 
strategy, as well as the development of legal safeguards. 
                                                 
 84. Constance E. Bagley, What’s Law Got to Do With It?: Integrating Law and 
Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 587, 588 (2010). See also Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal 
Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 12–38 (2008) (identifying five behaviors that 
managers can use to gain competitive advantage). 
 85. See Bagley, supra note 84, at 588–89. 
 86. See id. 
 87. Bagley, supra note 82, at 380. 
 88. See Bagley, supra note 84, at 589. 
 89. Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a 
Global Organization: The Role of General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1061 (1997). 
 90. Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielson, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: 
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 
463 (2000). 
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C.  The Judgment Component of Legal Astuteness 
Bagley’s discussion of judgment recognizes that much ambiguity 
and uncertainty often infuse both legal analysis and business strategy and 
thus, it is crucial that managers cultivate deliberative wisdom.91  An 
appreciation for the law can help in this regard, as precedent can guide 
analogical reasoning and professional norms, such as prudence can promote 
caution.  Moreover, legal astuteness, at least on Bagley’s account, also 
includes a recognition of the cognitive biases and pressures that can 
compromise good decision making.92 
D.  The Knowledge Component of Legal Astuteness 
The fourth component of “legal astuteness” refers to the specific 
and substantive advantage that legal literacy and functional familiarity with 
“the role that law plays in setting the rules of the game.”93  Bagley argues 
that business managers with the ability to “harness the creative power of 
legal language are more adept at seeing and shaping the legal structure of 
the world.”94  Specifically, she identifies “legal astuteness” as: 1) an ability 
to use legal tools, such as contracts in ways that strengthen relationships 
and create options while reducing transaction costs; and 2) an ability to 
convert regulatory constraints into opportunities and creative advantages.95 
V.  ETHICAL ASTUTENESS 
Drawing upon the concept of legal astuteness as developed by 
Bagley, I define ethical astuteness as a substantive and strategic focus by a 
firm’s management team on its ethical responsibilities to patients and public 
health. 
The view of ethical astuteness that I am introducing and outlining 
in this paper aims to add value for a firm in the healthcare business – with a 
particular application to a for-profit organization providing dialysis services 
– by addressing two chief concerns: A.) The competing priorities between 
the patient’s interest in the healthcare encounter and the investor’s interest 
in generating a return on profits; and B.) The vulnerabilities of a 
financially-conflicted, for-profit healthcare provider to an allegation of 
medical malpractice. 
                                                 
 91. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 132 (1995). 
 92. Bagley, supra note 82, at 382. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 383. 
 95. Id. at 386–87. 
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A.  Professional Priorities and Safeguards 
As Leonard Weber has observed, healthcare management ethics is 
business ethics, “but business ethics with a difference.”96  Weber frames his 
discussion of healthcare business ethics in terms of the healthcare 
organization’s responsibility to community service.97  He writes that 
community-based ethics “requires of for-profits that they be managed with 
a strong sense of social responsibility, such that they are fully and 
realistically committed to serving the community at the same time that they 
are committed to being profitable.”98  This sense of social responsibility 
extends to a commitment to high-quality services and a commitment to 
respecting patient rights. As discussed earlier, this respect for patient rights 
flows from a respect for the person and the patient’s right to autonomy. 
A robust culture of ethical astuteness can help remind and guide 
management personnel charged with the daily operation of a dialysis clinic 
that their business decisions must reflect these complex competing interests 
of patients and communities.  In the business of healthcare, justification of a 
decision solely on the basis of profit or return on investment – without 
recognition of additional stakeholders and reconciliation with the priorities 
of medical ethics and professional standards among healthcare providers – 
is unsustainable as a matter of business practice.  As argued previously, the 
business of healthcare is unique and must be practiced differently than other 
business enterprises. 
Moreover, another manifestation of ethical astuteness among 
healthcare managers and business of medicine practitioners can result in 
greater awareness of the “heuristics and biases” literature.99  Indeed 
findings from this literature and the field of behavioral ethics suggest that 
errors in framing, for example, contribute to erroneous ethical decision-
making.100  For instance, ethical astuteness would mandate that a manager 
of a dialysis clinic frame his business priorities each and every day in terms 
of patient care, vis-à-vis staffing decisions, training, and maintenance of 
equipment, just as much – if not more than – the attention paid to matters of 
                                                 
 96. LEONARD J. WEBER, BUSINESS ETHICS IN HEALTHCARE: BEYOND COMPLIANCE 5 
(2001). 
 97. Id. at 6. 
 98. Id. at 6–7. 
 99. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974). As Professor Robert Prentice notes, this article 
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ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 4, 6 (forthcoming 2015) (citing DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST 
AND SLOW 8 (2011)). 
 100. RONALD A. HOWARD & CLINTON D. KORVER, ETHICS FOR THE REAL WORLD: 
CREATING A PERSONAL CODE TO DECISIONS IN WORK AND LIFE 95 (2008) (“[O]ur biggest 
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budget, payroll, advertising, and market share.  As Professor Prentice 
argues: 
Moral awareness is a precondition to moral action. 101 It 
should be the moral responsibility of every individual, to 
keep ethical considerations in his or her own frame of 
reference whenever making decisions. And it is the 
responsibility of firms that wish their employees to act 
legally and ethically to continually prompt them to do so. 
The behavioral ethics literature indicates that this can have 
a meaningful impact.102 
B.  Pragmatic and Authentic Strategy 
As a matter of practical, prophylactic business strategy, a 
healthcare delivery firm, such as a dialysis clinic, could be well-served to 
create a culture of ethical astuteness that intentionally “promote[s] an 
organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to 
compliance with the law,” and thereby formalize protections from liability 
that might flow from negligent patient care or disgruntled employees.103  
Professor David Hess has documented the role that codes of conduct and 
compliance programs, particularly when mandated by legislation like the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 
can play in “proactively managing the ethical environment of their 
firms.”104  Hess argues that management seeking to heighten ethical 
awareness must be careful not either to focus exclusively on employee 
monitoring and control or to adopt regulatory, ethical compliance programs 
simply as a form of “insurance” in the case of litigation.105  In the context of 
dialysis and other health care settings, management must personally 
demonstrate a commitment to patient-first ethics and incorporate this 
commitment to patient care into strategic business decisions and cultivation 
of the organization’s culture. 
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Hess advocates for an approach to organizational ethical awareness 
that builds integrity through an emphasis on organizational values and 
employee self-governance, similar to what Professor Lynn Sharp Paine and 
others began describing twenty years ago.106  With an authentic, integrity-
based ethics program, the focus is on creating an organizational culture 
where employees are encouraged to discuss ethical issues and rewarded for 
making responsible choices.  Equipping and empowering employees to 
make decisions – in the context of dialysis – that are in the best interest of 
the patient should be among management’s top priorities.  Ultimately, it 
will be a sense of ownership among the employees that will characterize the 
ethical awareness that flows from an organization’s strategic and authentic 
integrity-based approach to ethics. 
An illustration that demonstrates the distinctive behavior of 
employee “ownership” can be found in the context of a vacation rental car.  
When one rents a car on vacation, changing the oil never crosses the 
renter’s mind.  A car renter is merely using the car for a short time, without 
any sense of personal investment in the long-term condition of the car.  
Contrast this behavior with one who purchases a car.  The reality of 
ownership is that one must invest in the long-term care of the car, including 
regular oil changes, so as to preserve the condition and long-term benefits 
of the car.  Similarly, fostering a sense of employee ownership is a critical 
component to creating a climate of ethical astuteness that not only might 
mitigate liability in a litigation context, but also should help promote a 
more genuine commitment to patient care by all members of the health care 
organization’s staff.  In other words, emphasizing ethical astuteness should 
cause an organization to shift from a focus on mere compliance to a focus 
on authentic employee buy-in vis-à-vis prioritizing patient care.  The 
potential defense shield in the event of litigation, however, is a strategic and 
potentially valuable corollary benefit.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As noted above, mistakes are made in the delivery of healthcare 
services, and medical malpractice actions frequently follow.  Imagine a 
hypothetical situation involving a dialysis clinic patient whose needle 
becomes dislodged, resulting in the patient’s death, and subsequent tort 
action for malpractice and wrongful death.  If the plaintiff’s counsel can 
establish that the death occurred as a result of the clinic’s failures to 
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adequately secure the needle and/or failures to adequately monitor the 
patient to ensure that the access site remained visible throughout the 
duration of dialysis treatment, the plaintiff’s lawyer will surely further 
connect the dots by arguing that either or both were more likely to occur 
because financial pressures to deliver profits were in conflict with the 
dialysis clinic’s primary duty to do what is in the best interest of the patient. 
As the literature and lawsuits noted throughout this Article 
demonstrate, in addition to the behavioral ethics literature documenting 
why good people/organizations often fail to make good choices/policies,107 
the tensions between financial best interests and patients’ best interests are 
not always resolved by for-profit health care facilities and for-profit 
providers in ways that promote or safeguard patient well-being. 
In the absence of evidence documenting a culture of ethical 
astuteness, it will be difficult for the dialysis clinic to rebut the presumption 
that divided loyalties introduced by for-profit firm structures is particularly 
dangerous for dialysis patients who are in a vulnerable position – 
physically, emotionally and psychosocially.  In front of a jury, dialysis 
patients who rely on the nurses and techs and other employees at the 
dialysis facility to put the patients’ best interest first and foremost, will be 
sympathetic plaintiffs indeed.  One need not be an avid viewer of 
courtroom television dramas to imagine the plaintiff counsel’s closing 
argument: 
And so, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it is for you to 
decide—in the absence of any culture of ethical awareness 
or astuteness—whether it is more likely than not that if the 
nurses and techs and other dialysis clinic employees had 
put the patient’s well-being first on that fateful morning, 
his needle would not have become dislodged and remain 
dislodged resulting in the catastrophic exsanguination that 
resulted in his death.  Surely, you must reach the 
conclusion that the dialysis clinic’s failure to keep the 
patient’s best medical interest and personal wellbeing as 
the business’s primary interest can be best explained as an 
unintended consequence of a culture that – regardless of 
whatever corporate slogans and values are espoused by the 
corporation’s charismatic leader – was ultimately 
compromised by the subtle, yet powerful, incentives and 
influences created by this publicly traded health care 
corporation’s conflicting financial interests.  
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